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JURISDICTION

The Utah Court of Appeals has agreed to retain this appeal. Jurisdiction is
established by Utah Code Ann. Section 78A-4-103.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND RULES

1.

Utah R. Civ. P. 7.

2.

Utah R. Civ. P. 12.

3.

Utah R. Civ. P. 56.

4.

Utah R. Civ. P. 60
RELEVANT FACTS

1. This case was filed, with multiple claims by both parties against each other, in the

year 2006. R. at 1.

2. After years of useless motions, changes in counsel and many delays, the case was
finally given to the lower court on a partial summary judgment motion, which the court
granted in favor of Appellees. A. at 5,601.

3. Said judgment left some of the issues unresolved. However, Appellees moved for a
second summary judgment, which the lower court also granted. It eliminated all the
remaining issues of fact and law. R. at 6,026.
4. After said judgment was issued~ Appellants made many post-judgment motions,
attempting to have the same set aside or vacated. See record generally.
5. However, the lower court denied all the said extant motions and affirmed the two
summary judgments it had formerly made. R. at 6,435.

3

INTRODUCTORY NOTE
At the outset, Appellees wish to emphasize one fact: in the Appellants' brief, they
chose to completely ignore one very important order that the trial court handed down.
Shortly after the judgment from which the Appellants appeal was entered, the original
judge retired. After a new judge was brought on the case, Appellants spent several
months filing motions to reconsider and to set aside the retired judge's order, making
the exact same arguments they have made in their initial appeal. Indeed, the record
shows that they filed at least 9 post-judgment motions, all of which Appellees had to
counter, and most of which, in Appellees' opinion, were not allowed by the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. Finally, after all the motions were submitted to the lower court, one
more succinct memorandum decision came from the new judge on the case. In it, the
judge put to rest the very issues Appellants raise in the instant case. Appellees ask this
Court to study that decision carefully when deciding this case so that the Court may see
that these issues have already been dealt with. The decision is located at page 6,435 in
the record.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This case dragged on for over 8 years in the lower court. Something had to be
done to finish it. Appellees offer the following arguments in support of their Summary
Judgments which Appellants assail.
First, Appellants had approximately 3 months to oppose the summary judgment
motion in question. During that time, Appellees did not even submit it to the Court and,
still, Appellants did not answer. Further, the when the Court finally did sign the
judgment, it was well supported by the facts and law.
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Next, considering the protracted litigation preceding this appeal, the attorney fee
award given by the lower court is more than justified by statute.
Lastly, the subject trust, which Appellees have continually shown to be valid,
gave Appellees broad authority. Hence, the actions of the Appellees, which Appellants
deem to be breaches of fiduciary duty, were rightly and universally determined by the
lower court to be appropriate.

ARGUMENT
This case is simply one of mishandled procedural maneuvers and untimely
assertions of claims. Appellants simply did not follow the rules and, when given the
opportunity, were unable to show any evidence of their claims against Appellees.

I. APPELLANTS DID NOT FILE ANY OPPOSITION TO THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AT ISSUE FOR MANY MONTHS AND, THEREFORE, LOST THEIR RIGHT TO
OPPOSE IT.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56 is very clear about an opposition to a motion for
summary judgment. It states that "... (e)ach material fact set forth in the motion ... that is
not disputed is deemed admitted ... " See U.R.Civ.P. 56(a)(4).
Appellants cite this Court's decision in Pepperwood Homeowners Assn. v.

Mitchell as precedent for authority to undo a lower court's summary judgment. See Brief
of the Appellant, Page 22, Paragraph 1. However, the instant case is vastly different
from Pepperwood. In Pepperwood, a claimant sued a party for failure to pay H.O.A.
assessments. See Pepperwood, 351 P.3d 844 (Utah App. 2015) After bringing suit
against the party, the claimant moved for summary judgment, supporting the same with
everything but the very document that would prove that the other party was obligated to
pay the assessments. Id. Nevertheless, the other party faiJed to oppose the summary
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judgment motion in time and the extant lower court granted it Id. On appeal, this Court
reversed the summary judgment granted by the lower court because the extant
judgment was not supported by "... evidence of an instrument obligating (the party) to
pay the assessments... ", which instrument was the foundational document upon which

the original extant suit was brought. Id. at 848. The Pepperwood Court further stated
that " ... (i)t should... have been obvious to the district court that, by faiHng to produce the
instrument that formed the basis of its claim, (the claimant) failed to demonstrate its
entitlement to a judgment..." Id.
The instant case is the exact opposite of Pepperwood. As the facts above show,
Appellees came at this matter in what was ultimately a defensive posture: Appellants
sued them for breach of their fiduciary duties and they denied those accusations. Thus,
when Appellees presented their motion for summary judgment, it was to essentially
dismiss Appellants' claims of breach against them. They presented affidavits and
documents showing support for the same and the lower court, after careful
consideration and following over 8 years of titigation, granted the motion for summary
judgment.

Pepperwood involved the glaring omission of a fundamentat document at the
beginning of a short case. This case, howeverJ involves a judgment supported by all the
requisite evidence, following almost a decade of litigation where the facts had been
brought before the lower court many times. In sum: the lower court knew what it was

doing.
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Absent the authority of Pepperwood, which Appellees have shown above does
not relate to this case the Court is left with Rufe 56,- which affirms that "...
1

(e)ach .. .fact...that is not disputed is deemed admitted ... " U.R.Civ.P. 56(a)(4).

A.

EVEN IF THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE ALLOWED APPELLANTS TO

MAKE AN UNTIMELY OPPOSmON TO THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
THE SUBSEQUENT JUDGMENT FLOWING FROM rr WAS STILL JUSTIFIED ON
THE MERITS.

Assuming that Pepperwood applies, which it does not, Appellants themselves
state the rule that, even in cases of no response to a summary judgment motion, the
court "... must still determine whether the moving party's pleadings, discovery, and
affidavits demonstrate its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law... " See

Pepperwood, cited above. Appellees have done just that in this case. In fact, the lower
court questioned the factual and legal basis of the Appellees motion before it granted
the Summary Judgment which is at issue here. See R. at 6,457-6.463 If the Court
carefully reads the exchange between the original trial judge and Appellees' counsel, it
will see that such a basis was established before the lower court ruled. Id.
Specifically, the court looked at the ruling of a board of arbitration which cleared
the Trustees of any breach of fiduciary duty. Id. Further, the trust itself dictates that
boards of arbitration are the correct method in settling disputes just such as this case.
R. 6522, paragraph 2 and R. 6526, paragraphs 19 and 20.
Further, regarding the merits of the case and whether or not they were
considered as a basis for the judgment in question, the second judge at the trial level
stated in his memorandum opinion that,
... even if there were a mistake of law in (the lower court's) ruling on the
(motion for summary judgment), the instant motion (to set aside) is not
7

welt taken. ·'[A]n appeal or a motion for a new trial~ ratherthan a rule 60(b)
motion, is the proper avenue to address alleged mistakes of law
committed by the district court... Mistakes of law are excluded from the
narrow realm of 'mistakes' recognized under rule 60... typically 'minor
oversights, ...which in most cases would be obvious." R. at 6436,
paragraph 2nd full paragraph.
In other words, if Appellants had such a problem with the factual findings made by the
lower court, they should have used different procedural means to gain the relief they
sought: Appellants simply filed the wrong documents at the wrong time.
Appellants also state that Appellees' assertion that Appellee Penn Smith's
compensation rate was reasonable was supported by inadmissible hearsay. However,
even if that were the case, the lower court has the discretion, on its own, to determine
that $50 an hour for a trust manager's services is appropriate, which it did. Appellants
se.ek to impose the requirement on Appelfees that Mr. Smith should have to show that
he was promised payment by the Trust. As Mr. Smith's affidavit showed, he performed
services, the trust entitles him to compensation, and he had kept track of his time and
hours. See A. at 5421 - 5422 and R. at 5432.
Also to the facts themselves, the lower court also directly addressed the
opposing decisions of the two respective boards of arbitration, cited by Appellants in
their brief. In disposing of Appellants' present argument, the lower court stated,
... the (c)ourt is not convinced that the (Appellees) engaged in the 'gross
misrepresentation' of the 2007 Board's findings that the (Appellants) claim
entitles them to relief under Rule 60...This has been a contentious case
and the (c)ourt understands that the parties naturally characterize certain
matters very differently. There simply has not been, however, a
demonstration of the kind of fraud or misrepresentation that results in the
'prevention of an opposing party from fairly presenting his case' ... Id.
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B.

AFTER THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED, THE COURT ISSUED A
FINAL MEMORANDUM DECISION AFFIRMING ITS FORMER SUMMARY
JUDGMENTS AND DISPOSING OF APPELLANTS' ARGUMENT THAT THEY
WERE NOT GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD

Beyond the portion of the lower court's decision quoted above, the second lower
court judge directly addressed Appellants' main argument: that they were not given the
opportunity to oppose the summary judgment motion in question. In addressing this
claim, the lower court stated:
... (Appellants') belief is misbegotten. The docket indicates that they had
over three months to oppose the {motion) but did not because they
erroneously expected their Motion to Strike to suspend the normal
deadlines contained in Rules 7 and 56. It is true that Rule 12(f) states,
... Upon motion made by a party before responding to a
pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these
rules, upon motion made by a party within 21 days after the
service of the pleading, the court may order stricken from
any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant,
immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous mattec ..
A motion to strike may indeed, as (Appellants) contend, be made 'before
responding to a pleading.' A motion for summary judgment, however, is a
motion- not a pleading... Importantly for present purposes, then, ... (n)either
Rule 12(f) nor any other rule of procedure known to the (c)ourt justifies
(Appellants') position that they could await a ruling on the motion to strike
before responding to a motion for summary judgment. {Appellees')
(motion for summary judgment) was therefore not timely opposed at the
time of the November 26, 2013 pretrial conference, and (the first lower
court judge's) ruling certainly was not rendered without allowing
(Appellants) in this lengthy case 'an opportunity· to oppose summary
judgment..." R. at 6438

Appellants cite the rule regarding Motions to Strike and argue that the same freed them
from having to respond to Appellees' motion until the Motion to Strike was dealt with.
However, beyond the rule they cite not allowing for any such stay in the proceedings
(see U.R.Civ.P. 12(f) ), if the Court were to accept their argument, all any party would
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have to do to delay a court's ruling on any motion is to file a Motion to Strike. Such a
tactic would surely be against the public policy for efficient administration of justice.
C. THE LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE DID NOT PRECLUDE APPELLEES FROM
MAKING A SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Appellants also argue that "the law of the case'J doctrine should have prevented
the subject second motion for summary judgment from ever having been made. See
"Brief of the Appeflant" page 30. However, as AppeHees argued in their original
7

defense against this argument, Appellants completely miss the true definition of the law
of the case doctrine. In the very case Appellants cite, IHC Health Services, Inc. v. D & K

MANAGEMENT, INC., the Utah Supreme Court defined the doctrine thusfy, ~ ... (s)imply
stated ... a decision made on an issue during one stage of the case is bjnding in
successive stages of the same litigation ... " See IHC, 196 P.3d at 596 (Utah 2008), cited
by Appellants in their Brief, page 30.
The law of the case doctrine did not preclude the Second Motion for Summary
Judgment because said motion concerned wholly unresolved and undecided issues.
The law of the case doctrine only applies to final decisions made by the lower court.
The Court's attention is directed to the citation made in Appellants' brief regarding
the same IHCcase_ Id. at 30, last paragraph. In said citation, the Utah Supreme Court
further stated that the law of the case doctrine is meant to "... (further) the goals of
judicial economy and finality... " Id.
The question should be asked: which is more judicially economical, Summary
Judgment or Trial? Which takes less time? Which requires less expense? Appellees
submit that, in light of the fact that this case has gone on for almost a decade, the
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interests of judicial economy would lean sharply toward finishing the entire matter in a
summary judgment. All that was required of the Appellants at the lower court level was
to show some evidence of the Appellees' alleged breach of fiduciary duty and some
evidence of the alleged unreasonableness of Mr. Smith's wage claims and, if they would
have ever done so, they would have received their trial. For the entirety of the eight
plus years this case spent at the lower court, they gave the court neither. If nothing
else, the subject second Summary Judgment Motion was an effort to get Appellants to
show what they had. They were given ample opportunity to do so and they failed.
Additionally, the afore-cited IHC case had to do with a court's refusal to reopen a
forfeiture issue. Id. The issue had been previously decided and closed. Id. Specifically,
the court in IHC was reviewing the finality of a Partial Judgment on the Pleadings, not a
Summary Judgment. Id. The opposing party wanted to reopen the Judgment and the
Court stated that the law of the case doctrine prevented them from doing so because
their raising of the issue was untimely. Id.
1

Conversely, in this matter, the issues of breach of Appellees fiduciary duty and
wage claim reasonableness had not been closed by any previous lower court ruling. On
the contrary, the lower court had left them open and had deemed them still in dispute.
See lower court's first "Partial Summary Judgment" R. at 5,601.
Note the /HC court s statement here: " ... because the district court previously
1

decided the issue of forteiture, the law of the case doctrine gave the district court
discretion to refuse to reopen the issue... " Id. at 596. Now apply that quote to this case:
the Summary Judgment Motion in question does not concern an issue which had been

®
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previously decided by the lower court, but one which was stilt. pending when the lower
court subsequently resolved it.

II. THE ATTORNEY FEE AWARD FROM THE LOWER COURT WAS PROPER AND

LAWFUL.
Appellants cite Utah Code, Section 788-5-825 in support of their argument that
the lower court did not have a proper basis upon which to award attorney fees in this
case. See "Brief of the Appellant", page 41. Specifically, Appellants say that, because
the lower court did not make a specific finding regarding bad faith or meritless
arguments on the part of Appellants that the resulting attorney fee award was improper.
However, courts are given wide latitude in awarding attorney fees by the simple
language of the very statute cited by Appellants. The code states that "...the court shall
award reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing party if the court determines that the
action or defense to the action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good
faith ... " See U.C.A., Section 788-5-825(1).
The statue itself gives no requirement that specific findings of fact regarding bad
faith or meritless claims issue from the court.
However. in Appellees' second motion for summary judgment. they alleged the
following:
... To date, large swaths of the corpus of the Trust have been depleted and blown
away in the hurricane of frivolous litigation that has been perpetuated by the
(Appellants). Literally hundreds of thousands of dollars have been lost to attorneys
fighting over meaningless causes of action...This case should have been over in 2007
after the ... board of arbitration found that the Trustees had been acting properly.
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However, (Appellants) chose to continue their useless fight against the intent of their
father, (the Trustor) ... R. at 5,616.
In response to Appellees' assertion of frivolity and meritless claims on the part of
Appellants, the rower court then ruled as follows: "...the attorney fees.~-which have been
taken out of the ... trust corpus, later to be accounted for and totaled by this (c)ourt, are to
be paid back to the Trust by the (Appellants). Said amount shall be paid out of the
personal assets of the (Appellants) ... " R.

at 6,027.

While the lower court may not have made specific findings regarding the
allegations of bad faith and meritless claims Appellees leveled in their second motion for
summary judgment, its ruling regarding attorney fees was in direct response to the
same and should undoubtedly be considered as a direct affirmation of the allegations.
Since the statute does not require specific findings and the record of the lower court
shows that bad faith and frivolous claims were contemplated prior to its attorney fee
award, the judgment giving attorney fees to Appellees from Appellants should stand.
Ill.APPELLANTS' FIRST, NINTH, AND ELEVENTH CLAIMS WERE, IN FACT,
RESOLVED BY THE LOWER COURT'S ORDERS.

Appellants assert that their claims against Appellees for declaratory judgment,
conversion and waste were not ever addressed by the lower court. However, as the
lower court judgment states that "... (Appellees) ... are declared to be not in breach of any
fiduciary duty they... have owed to the (Trust) ... " R. at 6026.
In that one simple sentence, the judge disposed of the aforementioned claims.
While it may not have specifically addressed each onet let it be remembered that
Appellants' original complaint had many causes of action, most of which were redundant
and repetitive. To asks the court to address each one by name is wasteful.
13

IV.. THE SUBJECT llJUST ALLOWS APPELLEES, WHO WERE rrs TRUSTEES, TO
CHANGE THE TRUST SO THAT THE ORIGINAL TRUSTOR'S INTENT CAN BE
ACCOMPLISHED. THEREFORE, THE LOWER COURTS SUBSEQUENT
VALIDATION OF THAT TRUST, DESPITE THE IMPOSSIBILllY OF CERTAIN

CONDITIONS OF IT BEING FULFILLED, WAS p·ROPER.
Appellants also assert that the original Trust because the lease and stewardship
agreements contemplated by it were never executed, should be invalidated. However,
the Court is directed to the Trust itself, which gave the Appel.lees broad powers in trust
reformation and amendment It states, "... it is the intent of the TRUSTOH that upon the
death of any of the (Appellants) the STEWARDSHIP shall revert to the (Appellees) to be
hetd in trust for the minor male children ... " R. at 6524, paragraph 6. It also states that
" ... no (Appellant) ... shall be empowered to control the (Appelfees} in any way or dictate
management policies to the TRUST, or determine the disbursement of TRUST
increase ... " R. at 6526, paragraph 22. It further states that "... if any (Appellant) ... dies
without a named heir his STEWARDSHIP shall revert to the... (AppeHees), who shall
thereupon name a replacement Beneficiary... and issue to him ... a STEWARDSHIP... " Id.
at paragraph 25. Appellees were also given broad powers when the Trustor stated that
" ... (Appellees) shall have all powers necessary to carry out and perform the duties.
mandated to, and incumbent upon, them as TRUSTEES of this TRUST. .. " R. at 6,527
paragraph 29.
While the exact details of the trust may not have been accomplished, Appellees
continually upheld the Trustor's intent and any hinderance of that intent has only been
perpetuated by Appellants refusal to aHow Appellees to be in charge of the trust corpus,
as dictated by Appellants' father, the Trustor.

CONCLUSION
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@

For the reasons set forth above, Appellees request that the judgments of the
lower court in this case be affirmed.
Dated this / B'½J,-day of January, 2016.
CHAMBERLAIN LAW

!We-~·

Nicholas I. Chamberlain
Attorney for Appellees
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